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ABSTRACT: This study attempts to examine how much of the correlation in incomes across
generations can be explained by education and skill.  I find two different answers to this question
depending on how I instrument for years of schooling.  Using quarter of birth and proximity to a
local college as instruments, I find high returns to schooling, low returns to skill, and most of the
intergenerational mobility coefficient explained.  However, these instruments are poorly
correlated with years of education.  Thus, the estimates are imprecise and potentially biased. 
Furthermore, using family background variables as instruments, I find the opposite results. 
Moreover, if one excludes family income or skill as control variables then the estimates of the
returns to schooling are upwardly biased.  1
The Roles of Education, Skill and Parental Income in Determining Wages
I. Introduction
From the intergenerational mobility and returns to education literatures, one comes away
with two conclusions: a father’s permanent income is highly correlated with his son’s permanent
income and people with more education receive higher wages.  Undoubtably a portion of the first
conclusion is explained by the second.  Part of the reason why a son’s permanent income is
correlated with his father’s permanent income is because a father with a high income can provide a
child with more human capital investments such as education.  However, this might not fully
explain the role of a father’s income in determining a son’s wage.   This paper combines the
returns to education literature and the intergenerational mobility literature to ascertain how much
of the correlation of income across generations can be attributed to wealthy parents providing their
children with more education and skills.   
In a study of intergenerational mobility Corcoran et al. (1991) include respondent’s
education in one model specification.  After controlling for education, they find that a son’s
earnings are still highly influenced by family background variables including parent’s income, and
that the estimated returns to education is six percent which is in line with the education literature. 
This is evidence that education cannot fully explain family income’s role in determining a child’s
earnings.  However, since this study was asking predictive questions one cannot take their
estimates as the effect of family income and education on earnings.  In other words, this paper did
not take into account the possible endogeneity of the schooling decision.
Alternatively, Neal and Johnson (1996) find that controlling for skill as measured by the2 See Angrist and Krueger (1991).
3 See Card (1995a)
4 See Willis and Rosen (1979)
2
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT ) score explains much of the wage gap between blacks
and whites.  If there is a channel transmitting income from fathers to sons other than education or
skill then there should be a wage gap between whites and blacks after controlling for AFQT.  
Rischall (1998) estimates returns to education using instrumental variables under two
specifications, one where family income is accounted for and a second where it is not.  Under the
specification where family income is included, the returns to education are approximately four and
a half percent for males.  Alternatively, when not controlling for family income the estimate
increases to fourteen percent.  In the specification that controls for family income there is evidence
of low income mobility across generations.  Also, the black-white wage differential declines after
controlling for family income.  However, the estimate of the differential is not statistically
significant in either specification.  
Building on Rischall (1998), this essay compares the estimated returns to education using
different instrumental variables.  It shows how these instruments relate to family income and how
the estimated returns to education change when family income and skill measures are included as
determinants of wage.  Section II provides a simple model of how education and wages are
related.  Section III describes possible instruments for education. These instruments include
quarter of birth2, proximity to a local college3 and family background variables4.  Section IV
describes the data used in this paper.  Section V contains results.  The results differ greatly





returns to schooling are large.   The returns to skill are small, and most of the correlation between
income across generations is explained by these human capital investments.  However, these
instruments are poorly correlated with education and potentially bias the returns to education
estimates.  Alternatively, if one uses family background variables as instruments then one sees that
returns to education are small, the returns to skill are high and much of the correlation between
incomes across generation left unexplained.  Furthermore, not controlling for family income and
skill causes one to overestimate the returns to schooling.  Section VI compares the results of this
paper with other results in the returns to education literature.  Section VII provides concluding
remarks. 
II. Model
For the purposes of this paper, I propose a simple model of how education and wages are
related.5  Individuals choose education level to maximize the following utility function.
Let y be the present discounted value of lifetime earnings of the individual which is a function
(g(•)) of schooling (S), a vector of observable covariates (X) and an unobserved variable (,). 
The costs of schooling are an increasing, convex function (f(•)) of schooling, a vector of
observable covariates (Z) and an unobserved variable (<).  One important note is that there are



















influence both the cost of education and the earnings an individual receives.  Maximizing utility in
Equation (1) requires that optimal schooling (S*) satisfy the first order condition,
Equation (2) states that the marginal benefit of schooling equals the marginal costs.  In order to
implement this model empirically, one must choose functional forms for the marginal benefits and
costs.  I assume the following:
   Solving MB = MC and integrating the marginal benefit equation yield the following results:
> and ( are linear transformations of < and ".
To estimate the returns of education, one can estimate b from Equation (5).  If it is the case
that , are > uncorrelated then ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Equation (5) yields
consistent estimates of b and $.  However, this is an assumption that many are unwilling to make. 6 Bound and Jaeger (1996) provide evidence that quarter of birth may actually be correlated with
unobserved ability.
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In other words, many assume that there exists unobserved ability that affects both schooling and
earnings. An alternative assumption is that there is a variable in Z that is not a member of X and
that this variable in Z is uncorrelated with ,.  If this is the case, one can estimate Equation (5) by
using the variable in Z as an instrument for S*.  This will yield consistent estimates of b and $. 
However, now the problem becomes finding a valid instrument. 
III. Possible Instruments
In the returns to education literature many variables have been considered as possible
instruments for schooling.  In particular, this paper considers three types of instruments from this
literature: quarter of birth, proximity to a two or four-year college and family background
variables.
Quarter of birth: Angrist and Krueger (1991) use quarter of birth as an instrument for
schooling.  The theory behind this variable as an instrument comes from compulsory schooling
laws.  These laws require students to remain in school until they reach a specific age.  All students
start school at the same time.  However, students who are born in the first quarter of the year reach
the compulsory schooling age first, and are able to drop out of school earlier.  Quarter of birth
should be uncorrelated with any unobserved ability variables.  It should not directly affect wages,
but it should affect schooling.  Thus, it should be a valid instrument.6
Proximity to a two or four-year college: Card (1995a) uses proximity to a two or four-
year college as an instrument for schooling.  The theory behind this variable as an instrument is
that students who live in a county with a two or four-year college face lower costs of college7  This instrument may not be valid because communities with colleges may draw in families with high
ability children. Thus, it is possible that proximity to a local college will be correlated to unobserved ability.
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attendance.  Thus, living in a county that contains a college will affect a student’s enrollment
decision.  Furthermore, living in a county with a college should be uncorrelated with the student’s
unobserved ability and should not directly affect his or her wages.7
Family background variables: Willis and Rosen (1979) use family background variables
such as the education of the individual’s parents as instruments.  The validity of these instruments
is questionable because many believe that these variables have a direct effect on wages. 
Furthermore, Card (1998) shows that even if family background variables do not have an
independent causal effect on earnings, using them as instruments may cause even further bias of
OLS results.  This occurs if the family background variables are correlated with unobserved
ability. Card shows that if this is the case, controlling for the family background variables and
using OLS produces estimates of the returns to education with less bias than the OLS results
without controlling for background variables.  However, if one uses the family background
variables solely as instruments than the bias is worse than OLS.   The approach that I take is that
certain family background variables are valid instruments ( parent’s education) if one controls for
other family background variables (family income) and skill (AFQT). 
Nevertheless, family background variables should have a large effect on schooling.  An
advantage of these instruments over the other two sets of instruments is that the correlation
between schooling and parents’ schooling is very high relative to the correlation between
schooling and the other possible instruments.  Thus, if these variables are valid instruments the
precision of the instrumental variables estimation will be better using family background variables
rather than (or along with) quarter of birth or proximity to a college.  8 Staiger and Stock (1997) deal with this problem in regard to the Angrist and Krueger (1991) study.
Angrist and Krueger found IV estimates that are higher than OLS estimates. When Staiger and Stock correct for the
poor instrument bias they find estimates that are even higher than Angrist and Krueger’s IV estimates. One
possibility is that if Bound and Jaeger (1995) are correct and quarter of birth is correlated with unobserved ability
then one should see IV estimates higher than OLS estimates because of this correlation.
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However, the recent instrumental variable literature finds that imprecise estimates is not
the problem one should be concerned with when dealing with instruments that are poorly
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable.  Nelson and Startz (1990a and 1990b) show
that if an instrument is poorly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable the resulting
instrumental variables estimate is biased.  This bias is potentially worse than the bias from using
OLS.  Also, in the finite sample, asymptotic standard errors provide poor estimates for the true
standard errors.  Bound et al. (1995) considers multiple instruments and finds that even using large
samples does not protect one from the problems of small sample bias.  Furthermore, adding more
poorly correlated instruments may decrease the asymptotic standard errors, but it will also
increase the potential for small sample bias.8  Therefore, if family background variables are valid
instruments they will be more likely to give unbiased estimates of the returns to schooling.     
Now the question becomes whether the family background variables have a direct effect on
wages, making them invalid instruments.  One argument for the direct effect of family background
variables comes from a networking argument.  If one comes from a highly educated family, it is
likely to that his or her parents will know other highly educated families and that using this
networking will lead to a higher paying job for the individual.  However, this argument also works
for a family’s permanent income.  Connections and networking will increase the wages of a child
coming from a family with high permanent income.  Also, if an individual comes from a family
with high permanent income then this can decrease the opportunity cost of job search, increase the8
reservation wage and increase the observed wages of individuals.  This leads to an argument
where the effect of parental education on wages goes through parental income.  Thus, if one
includes parental income in the wage equation, other family background variables can be used as
instruments for schooling.
In other words, if family income is included it is considered both a member of X and Z, a
variable that affects the cost of education and earnings.  Other family background variables are
members of Z.  They only affect the cost of education and are valid instruments for education in the
earnings equation.  However, if parental income is excluded, it is part of the unobserved term in
both the cost of education and the earnings equations.  Since parental income is correlated with
other family background variables, the exclusion of parental income implies that other family
background variables are correlated with the unobserved term of the earnings equation.  Therefore,
the other family background variables are no longer valid instruments.  Validity of family
background variables as instruments depends on the inclusion of parental income as a member of
X. 
IV. Data
Data for this paper come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  The data contain
information on youth whose ages ranged from 14 to 22 in 1979.  These respondents have been
tracked in subsequent years, and I have information up to 1996.  The original sample contains
information on 5404 black and white males.  Of this original sample, I restrict my sample to those
who are 17 or younger and live with at least one parent in 1979.  I make this restriction because I
am interested in the relationship between family income and future wages and I do not want the9 This includes 20 observations where the respondent reported a wage below $1 or greater than $75.
10 Since I have omitted so many observations due to missing family background variables, I also report the
summary statistics of these observations for comparison.  The summary statistics indicate that the omitted group
does have lower wages, education and AFQT score.  These individuals also come from lower income families.
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family income measure corrupted by the respondent’s own earnings.  Also, Neal and Johnson
(1996) argue that AFQT score is an exogenous measure of skill for those under 17.   This reduces
my sample by 3132.  Further, I drop 467 observations with missing information on family
background variables including parent income and education.  I drop 867 observations with
missing wage data9, 22 observations with missing education data, 31 observations with missing
skill data and four observations with missing information on whether the respondent lives in the
South.  This leaves me with a final sample of 881 observations.  Variable definitions are contained
in Table 1.  Table 2 contains summary statistics.10  I will discuss variables of special interest
within the text.
Wage is the 1995 wage of the individual measured in 1992 dollars.  Family Income is the
income of the respondent’s family in 1979 measured in 1992 dollars. AFQT is the AFQT test
score of the respondent.  It is used as the measure of skill of the respondent.   
Dadedu and Momedu represent father’s and mother’s education in years.  Dadhouse and
Momhouse are indicators of whether there is a father (or stepfather) present in the respondent’s
household and whether there is a mother (or stepmother) in the respondent’s household in 1979. 
These four variables are the family background variables used as instruments.
4year and 2year are indicators of whether there is a 4 or 2 year college in the
respondent’s 1979 county of residence.  The variables are obtained by merging the NLSY with the
Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) from 1983-84.11 I have also estimated the regressions presented in the first three columns of Table 4 with the
observations that are missing family background variables.  In general, the results are similar to the results where I
have family background variables. The returns to education for the regression in column 2 is 8.5 percent. The
black-white wage gap estimates are about 4 percent  lower in the first two columns, but half a percent higher in the
third column. 
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Table 3 shows the correlation matrix between possible instruments, ln(Wage), Education
and ln(Family Income).  Notice the small correlation between the presence of a 4-year college in
the county of residence and Education.  The correlation is approximately 0.03, which would
suggest that even if this variable is a valid instrument, that using it for IV estimation will lead to
imprecise and biased results.  A similar story is true for the indicator of being born in the first
quarter.  The correlation between this indicator and Education is only 0.09.  Also, theory would
suggest that there be a negative correlation between being born in the first quarter and education. 
Lastly, the correlation between parent education variables and Education is relatively large, on
the order of 0.4.  This would suggest that if these variables are valid instruments, then using these
variables as  instruments would lead to fairly precise results.
Also, one should note the high correlation between ln(Family Income), parent education
variables and the presence of a 4-year college.  This would suggest that if ln(Family Income)
belongs in the wage equation and it is omitted, then using parent education variables and the
presence of a 4-year college as instruments will lead to inconsistent results.  
To show the consistency of my data with respect to similar data sets, Table 411 presents log
wage regressions that can be compared to previous research.  From this table one sees a 32
percent wage gap between blacks and whites.  This gap is larger than the 24 percent gap reported
by Neal and Johnson (1996).  The gap becomes about six percent after controlling for AFQT
score.  Neal and Johnson (1996) report a seven percent gap after controlling for AFQT score. 12  I estimated the regressions in the first two columns of Tables 5A and 5B with the observations that are
missing family background information. The results do not change much when I use this subsample. The returns to
11
Controlling for family income, as well as AFQT, causes the black - white wage gap to disappear
in my sample.
With respect to the intergenerational income mobility literature, my estimate of the mobility
coefficient is quite small.  The coefficient on ln(Family Income) is 0.26.  Solon (1992) and
Zimmerman (1992) report that the estimate should be approximately 0.4.  However, my estimate is
not out of line with the estimate of 0.15 reported by Sewell and Hauser (1975) or the 0.18 reported
by Behrman and Taubman (1985).   My estimate is probably downward biased because of
measurement error.  Ideally, I would be estimating wage as a function of parent’s permanent
income.  Since, I only observe parent’s income one year, I have a poor measure of permanent
income.  Furthermore, I want to observe parent’s income.  The studies I have cited look at father’s
income.  It is unclear how mobility will change when also accounting for mother’s income.  To
account for measurement error I have also estimated the mobility coefficient using instrumental
variables.  The estimate increases to a range of 0.36 to 0.47, which is in line with the Solon
(1992) and Zimmerman (1992) estimates. 
Overall, Table 4 implies that my data are similar to that used in other studies.  The
following section considers how the returns to education change under various specifications that
include and exclude ln(Family Income) and AFQT.  The wage equation is estimated by OLS, and
IV using various instruments.
V. Results 
Tables 5A and 5B12  present OLS estimates of the returns to schooling under differenteducation estimates are about 8 percent when one does not control for AFQT and they decrease to 4.5 percent if
one does control for AFQT. 
13 I estimated the regressions in the first columns of Tables 6A and 6B with the observations that are
missing family background information. The returns to education estimates is about 12.3 percent when one does
not control for AFQT and they decrease to 9.4 percent if one does control for AFQT. Both these estimates have
standard errors that are approximately the size of the estimate. 
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specifications.  The estimates of the returns to schooling are relatively consistent across
specifications, only changing when controlling for AFQT.  The estimates range from 7.5 percent to
8.7 percent when not controlling for AFQT.   When controlling for AFQT, the estimates decline to
a range of 4.5 percent to 4.9 percent.   One interesting feature of these estimates is that the only
family background variable that has a coefficient estimate significantly different than zero at a ten
percent level is ln(Family Income).  Furthermore, one cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the
parental education variables equal zero.  The estimates that are positive are small.  Thus, the OLS
estimates show that there is little predictive power for earnings in family background variables
other than family income.  Another feature of the wage regressions to consider is the black-white
wage gap.  When not controlling for either AFQT or family income, the black-white wage gap is
statistically significant at a five percent level and approximately 25 percent.  Controlling for
AFQT causes the gap to decline to approximately twelve percent.  Furthermore, when one also
controls family income the gap declines to below 6.5 percent and is not statistically significant at a
five percent level.  Finally, the results are consistent with Corcoran et al. (1991) where OLS
estimates of returns to education change little when family income is included in the estimating
equation.  
Tables 6A and 6B13  present Instrumental Variables estimates of the returns to schooling,
where quarter of birth dummies are used to instrument for education.  I use the quarter of birth13
dummies first, because I believe that this variable is least likely to be correlated with unobserved
ability and omitted family background variables. The estimates for returns to schooling are larger
than the ones obtained by OLS, suggesting returns of over seventeen percent.  The OLS estimate
being smaller than the instrumental variables estimate is an interesting feature.  A common
explanation for the OLS bias is the following: the unobserved variable is ability or motivation. 
People with higher ability and motivation also tend to be the ones who obtain more education.  By
not accounting for the correlation between ability and schooling, one mistakenly attributes the
returns to ability as returns to education.  Therefore, the estimated returns to education are biased
upwards.
However, Card (1995b) examines a set of returns to education papers whose results are
not consistent with this explanation.  The paper finds that many studies that use instrumental
variables obtain higher estimates of the returns to education with IV than they obtain with OLS. 
Card argues that the instrumental variable estimates are not estimates of the returns to education,
rather they are estimates of the average marginal return to an extra year of education.  Individuals
buy education up to the point where marginal benefit equals marginal costs.  The marginal returns
to education are decreasing in the quantity of education and students from poorer families have
higher marginal costs.  Therefore, students from poorer families end their education earlier, but
have a higher marginal return to education than those students who end their education later.  As a
result, Card argues that the OLS estimates understate the returns to education.  
However, there are other possible reasons for Card’s results. Payne and Siow (1998)
show that IV estimates larger than OLS estimates can be caused an omitted factor input into the
wage equation. If education and the other input are substitutes then IV estimates should be larger
than OLS estimates. Furthermore, the IV estimate provides a lower bound on the true returns to14
education. 
  Another possible reason for Card’s result, as mentioned before, the instruments could be
poor.  In other words, the instruments are not highly correlated with years of schooling.  Thus, the
estimates are imprecise and biased.   Along these lines a  feature to consider is the first stage F-
stat.  This is the statistic used to test the whether all the coefficients of the instruments are zero in
the first stage regression.  The F-stats of 2 to 4 imply that one rejects the hypothesis that all of the
coefficients are zero.  However, this does not imply using these instruments will not cause bias
from poor correlation.  The results from Bound et al. (1995) indicate that using three instruments
with a first stage F-stat of 4 implies that the IV estimates have nine percent of the bias of the OLS
estimate.  Furthermore, asymptotic standard errors are probably too small.  In order to observe the
magnitude of this problem I also calculated the standard errors by bootstrapping.  I find that the
asymptotic standard errors on Education in the first four columns of Tables 6A and 6B are
underestimated by 0.02.
The last two columns of Tables 6A and 6B contain estimates of the returns to schooling
when I use family background variables along with the quarter of birth dummies as instruments. 
Including the extra instruments reduces the asymptotic standard errors by more than half. 
Furthermore, the bootstrapped standard errors and the asymptotic standard errors differ by only a
few thousandths.  These estimates of the returns to education are also all larger than their OLS
counterparts.  However, the point estimates of the returns to education are smaller than the ones
suggested by using just quarter of birth as an instrument.  Also, both the returns to skill and the
coefficient on family income are larger when one uses the family background variables as
instruments.  Also, the black-white wage gap declines.  It is statistically insignificant when
conditioning on family income and AFQT. 14I estimated the regressions in the first columns of Tables 7A and 7B with the observations that are
missing family background information. The returns to education estimates is about 7.3 percent when one does not
control for AFQT and they decrease to 2.8 percent if one does control for AFQT. Both these estimates have
standard errors that are larger than the size of the estimate. 
15  Bound et al. (1995) report that IV estimates have 0.00 bias relative to the OLS estimates when the first
stage F-stats are larger than 10 and two instruments are used. 
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Tables 7A and 7B14, also contain Instrumental Variable estimates.  In this case, the
instruments are proximity to two and four-year colleges and quarter of birth.  The results in these
tables are similar to those in Tables 6A and 6B.  The IV estimates of the returns to schooling are
larger than the OLS estimates.  However, with the extra proximity instruments included the
estimates decline from the IV estimates of Tables 6A and 6B.  None of the family background
variables have a statistically significant effect on wages with the exception of family income. 
Again, the asymptotic standard errors of the returns to education estimate are about 0.02 smaller
than the bootstrapped standard errors for the first four columns, whereas the difference of the final
two columns is only a few thousandths.
In Tables 7A and 7B extra instruments were included in order to get more precise
estimates.  However, as pointed out earlier adding extra instruments that are more poorly
correlated with education might do more harm than good.  Thus in Table 8, I present returns to
education estimates using only Momedu and Dadedu as instruments.  When one does not control
for either AFQT or family income the returns to education are 12.3 percent which is larger than
OLS estimates.  The upward bias in these IV estimates could be caused by not cotrolling for
AFQT.  If one does not control for AFQT then parntal education is correlated with the unobserved
ability term.  However, when one controls for AFQT and family income there is a sharp decline in
the estimates of the returns to education to 0.5 percent.  Furthermore, the large first stage F-stats
and the fact that I am only using two instruments imply that there is little bias in these estimates.15  16
Moreover, the asymptotic and bootstrapped standard errors of the returns to education only differ
by a few thousandths.
The results in Table 8 are not exclusive to the NLSY.  I estimated the parameters of similar
wage equations using the data from National Longitudinal Survey: Class of 1972 (NLS72).  Using
OLS, the NLS72 estimates of the returns to education range from 6.5 to 7.6 percent.  Using
Instrumental Variables and not controlling for skill or family income, the returns to education
estimate is 11.7 percent.  The returns to education estimate drops to 5.8 percent if one controls for
both family income and skill.  This estimate has a standard error of 0.038.  Therefore, one cannot
reject the hypothesis that the rate of return is zero if one controls for family income and skill, just
as in the NLSY.
Thus, from these results one can see two very different pictures of the role of AFQT score,
education and family income in determining wages.  If one believes that family background
variables are inappropriate instruments and relies on quarter of birth and proximity to a college as
instruments then one sees large returns to education.  Furthermore, there is little role for AFQT and
family income in determining wages beyond their influence on education.  However, these results
are likely to be biased due to the poor correlation between the instruments and education. 
Alternatively, if one believes that the family background variables are appropriate then the returns
to education are small.  Wages are determined by AFQT score and family income.
This leads one to question the appropriateness of family background variables as
instruments.  In order to answer this question, I regressed the residuals from each of the
regressions in Tables 6A, 6B, 7A, 7B and 8 on the exogenous variables and instrument of each
regression.  The number of observations multiplied by the R2 from these regressions are
distributed P2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of  overidentifying restrictions under16 Standard errors in parentheses. Other covariates: region in 1966, SMSA in 1996, race, in South in
1976, family structure at age 14, father’s and mother’s education, quadratic in experience (treated as endogenous). 
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the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.   One cannot reject the validity of any of the
instruments in the above regressions at a 5 percent significance level.  The test statistic is reported
as nR2 in Tables 6A, 6B, 7A, 7B and 8.  Furthermore, the test statistic is approximately zero when
one uses only Momedu and Dadedu as instruments.  However, since the parent’s education
variables are so highly correlated the tests have little power.
Finally, a note should be made on how to interpret the result that the returns to education
estimate is close to zero.  It is unlikely that education has no effect on earnings. However, the
object of interest might be wrong. Instead of focusing on the returns to an extra year of education,
one should focus on the returns to increased quality of education. It is quite possible that the results
are being driven by AFQT score and family income being better proxies for education quality than
years of education.    
VI. Relationship to Previous Literature 
The results of the previous section are consistent with those of the previous returns to
education studies.  Card (1995b) reviews a portion of this literature and finds that when variables
such as quarter of birth or proximity to a local college are used as instruments then OLS estimates
are smaller than the IV estimates.  For example, using nearby college in county of residence in
1966 as an instrument using the NLS Young Men Survey, Card (1995a) finds that the OLS estimate
is 0.073 (0.004) and the IV estimate is 0.132 (0.049).16  Similarly, Angrist and Krueger (1991)
using the males born from 1930-1939 surveyed in the 1980 census and using year*quarter of birth
and state*quarter of birth as instruments finds that the OLS estimate is 0.0628 (0.0003) and the IV17 Standard errors in parentheses. Other covariates: race, central city, married, age, age-squared, state of
residence, state of birth.
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estimate is 0.0811 (0.0109). 17  Using similar instruments I found comparable results.  My OLS
estimate is approximately eight percent and using the similar instruments my IV estimates are
approximately twelve to seventeen percent.  As pointed out earlier a possible reason for the IV
estimates being larger than the OLS estimates is that the instruments are poorly correlated with
education and the resulting IV estimates are biased.  Using more highly correlated instruments I
find that the returns to schooling are close to zero if one controls for AFQT and family income. 
However, if one does not control for either AFQT or family the OLS estimate is eight percent and
the IV estimate is twelve percent.  If one controls for family income only the OLS and IV results
are similar.  This last result is in line with results from the sibling literature.
The sibling literature estimates the returns to education by considering brothers.  The
unobservables in the earnings equation that are correlated with education are assumed to be family
specific.  Thus differencing the outcomes of brothers gets rid of the endogeneity problem.  The
returns to education can be estimated by regressing differenced earnings on differenced education. 
However, differencing exacerbates problems of measurement error.  Thus, researchers instrument
for differenced education.  Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) using a matched brother sample
from the NLS original cohort finds the OLS estimate and the differenced then instrumented estimate
of the returns to schooling are very similar.  On the other hand, in a study of identical twins
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) finds the differenced an instrumented estimates to be much larger
than the OLS estimates.  However, Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) using a larger sample of
identical twins finds results similar to Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997).  A problem with these
studies is the assumption that all of the unobserved differences that affect education are family19
specific.  Grililches (1979) points out this problems and shows the correlation in IQ scores across
siblings is 0.5.  Thus, even though children in the same family have similar abilities, these abilities
are not the same.  If a variable such as AFQT is not family specific there is still an omitted
variable problem.  In my results not accounting for AFQT implied that OLS results were similar to
IV results.  Including AFQT score caused a sharp decline in my estimate of the returns to
education. 
VII. Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to examine how much of the correlation in earnings across
generations can be explained by skill and education.  Estimating the returns to education leads to
two very different answers to this question.  If one believes that family background variables are
valid instruments for education, then one sees that the returns to schooling are small.  Furthermore,
there are high returns to skill and a portion of the intergenerational income mobility coefficient is
left unexplained.
On the other hand, if one believes that family background variables are invalid instruments
for years of education and relies on instruments such as quarter of birth and proximity to a local
college then one sees high returns to education, on the order of ten to seventeen percent. 
Furthermore, there are low returns to skill and most of the intergenerational mobility coefficient is
explained by schooling.
However, the small correlations between quarter of birth, proximity to a local college and
education makes one question the validity of these instruments.  The estimates from these
instruments are imprecise and possibly biased.  Furthermore, one cannot reject the validity of the20
family background variables as instruments.  Thus, the most plausible answer seems to be that the
returns to education are small, and that excluding family income and skill as determinants of wage
overstates the returns to education.  There are high returns to skill and much still needs to be
explained about the channel that distributes parents wealth to children.  One possibility is that
years of education might be the wrong object of interest. One should focus on the returns to
increased quality of education. It is quite possible that the results are being driven by skill and




Wage The 1995 wage of the individual measured in 1992 dollars.
Family Income The income of the respondent’s family in 1979 measured in 1992 dollars.
AFQT The AFQT test score of the respondent.  It is used as the measure of skill
of the respondent. 
Education  The number of years of schooling the respondent had completed by May
1994.
Age The age of the respondent in 1995.
White An indicator of whether the respondent is white.
South An indicator of whether the respondent lived in the South in 1994.
SMSA An indicator of whether the respondent lived in an SMSA in 1994.
NE79 An indicator of whether the respondent lived in the Northeast Region in
1979.
NC79 An indicator of whether the respondent lived in the North Central Region
in 1979.
S79 An indicator of whether the respondent lived in the South Region in 1979.
W79 An indicator of whether the respondent lived in the West Region in 1979.
SMSA79 An indicator of whether the respondent lived in an SMSA in 1979.
Dadedu The highest grade completed by the respondent’s father.
Momedu The highest grade completed by the respondent’s mother.
Dadhouse Indicator of whether there is a father (or stepfather) present in the
respondent’s household and  in 1979.22
Table 1 Continued
Variable Definitions
Momhouse Indicator of whether there is a mother (or stepmother) present in the
respondent’s household and  in 1979.
Quarter I Indicator of whether the respondent was born in the first quarter of the
year.
Quarter II Indicator of whether the respondent was born in the second quarter of the
year.
Quarter III Indicator of whether the respondent was born in the third quarter of the
year.
4year Indicator of whether there is a 4 year college in the respondent’s 1979
county of residence. 
2year Indicator of whether there is a 2 year college in the respondent’s 1979
county of residence. 23
Table 2
Summary Statistics
Observations With No Missing
Family Background Variables
Observations With 1 or More
Missing Family Background
Variables
Variable # obs Mean
Standard
Deviation # obs Mean
Standard
Deviation
Wage 881 13.48 9.01 467 12.06 8.40
Ln(Wage) 881 2.42 0.61 467 2.29 0.64
Family Income 881 43505.92 27389.81 225 27672.75 22750.56
Ln(Family Income) 881 10.47 0.69 221 9.95 0.80
AFQT 881 0.00 0.94 467 -0.35 0.97
Education 881 13.36 2.42 467 12.87 2.31
Age 881 32.95 1.04 467 32.90 1.03
White 881 0.72 0.45 467 0.55 0.50
South 881 0.37 0.48 465 0.47 0.50
SMSA 881 0.78 0.41 467 0.78 0.41
NE79 881 0.19 0.39 467 0.19 0.39
NC79 881 0.34 0.47 467 0.25 0.44
S79 881 0.34 0.48 467 0.45 0.49
W79 881 0.12 0.33 467 0.09 0.29
SMSA79 875 0.68 0.47 466 0.63 0.48
Dadedu 881 11.63 3.32 297 11.90 3.43
Momedu 881 11.68 2.38 391 11.38 2.58
Dadhouse 881 0.88 0.33 357 0.80 0.40
Momhouse 881 0.97 0.18 430 0.95 0.22
Quarter I 881 0.23 0.42 467 0.20 0.40
Quarter II 881 0.26 0.44 467 0.24 0.43
Quarter III 881 0.28 0.45 467 0.32 0.47
4year 858 0.74 0.44 451 0.70 0.46
2year 858 0.88 0.33 451 0.87 0.3424
Table 3
Variance/Covariance and Correlation Matrix: 
Possible Instruments, ln(Wage), Education and  ln(Family Income)
ln(Wage) Education Momedu Dadedu 4year Quarter I ln( Family
Income)
ln(Wage) 0.37 0.39* 0.26* 0.27* 0.04 0.06 0.34*
Education 0.57 5.85 0.43* 0.42* 0.03 0.09* 0.31*
Momedu 0.37 2.46 5.65 0.62* 0.15* -0.01 0.40*
Dadedu 0.54 3.33 4.88 11.05 0.12* -0.03 0.41*
4year 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.19 -0.02 0.12*
Quarter I 0.02 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.18 -0.01
ln(Family
 Income)
0.14 0.51 0.65 0.94 0.04 0.00 0.48
Note: Variance/Covariance Matrix is the diagonal and lower triangle portion of the matrix.  The Correlation Matrix
is the upper triangle.  * estimate of correlation coefficient is  significant at a .01 level (one-tailed test).25
Table 4
Log Wage Regressions
White 0.3174* 0.2570* 0.0643 -0.0093 0.1443*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Age 0.0422* 0.0316 0.0380* 0.0311 0.0299







ln(Family Income) 0.1550* 0.2572*
(0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.0589 0.1912 0.2154 0.2381 0.1277




Education 0.087** 0.088** 0.081** 0.080** 0.075**
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.032* 0.031* 0.031* 0.030* 0.025
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
White 0.265** 0.253** 0.237** 0.220** 0.166**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048)
South -0.021 0.097 0.101 0.105 0.096
(0.040) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067)
SMSA 0.155** 0.127** 0.121** 0.121** 0.114**
(0.046) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Momedu 0.012 0.011 0.031
(0.010) (0.010) (0.046)








Region79 No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.203 0.209 0.212 0.214 0.231
obs 881 875 875 875 875
Note: Region79 = Yes implies NE79, NC79, W79 and SMSA79 have been included in the estimation. 
 (standard errors in parentheses) * estimate significant at 10% level .  ** estimate is significant at 5% level.27
Table 5B
Log Wage Regressions Controlling for AFQT
Estimation Technique: OLS
Education 0.047** 0.049** 0.048** 0.047** 0.045**
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age 0.034** 0.033* 0.032* 0.032* 0.028
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
White 0.127** 0.124** 0.124** 0.103** 0.064
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.050)
South 0.001 0.079 0.080 0.085 0.078
(0.039) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066)
SMSA 0.132** 0.102** 0.102** 0.102** 0.097*
(0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Momedu 0.003 0.002 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)








AFQT 0.183** 0.178** 0.176** 0.177** 0.168**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
AFQT2 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.029 -0.023
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Region79 No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.245 0.248 0.248 0.251 0.263
obs 881 875 875 875 875
Note: Region79 = Yes implies NE79, NC79, W79 and SMSA79 have been included in the estimation. 
 (standard errors in parentheses)  * estimate significant at 10% level.  ** estimate is significant at 5% level.28
Table 6A
Log Wage Regressions
Quarter of Birth as an Instrument for Education
Education 0.151* 0.172** 0.142* 0.157** 0.126** 0.099**
  (0.082) (0.082) (0.080) (0.078) (0.017) (0.020)
Age 0.025 0.019 0.026 0.020 0.028 0.024
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
White 0.224** 0.168** 0.224** 0.181** 0.240** 0.168**
(0.069) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.045) (0.050)
South -0.006 0.006 -0.017 -0.010 -0.012 -0.004
(0.046) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039)
SMSA 0.094 0.061 0.113* 0.090 0.118** 0.116**
(0.093) (0.079) (0.061) (0.058) (0.049) (0.047)
Momedu -0.006 -0.017 Inst Inst
(0.024) (0.022)
Dadedu -0.003 -0.010 Inst Inst
(0.015) (0.014)
Momhouse 0.023 0.000 Inst Inst
(0.132) (0.131)
Dadhouse 0.067 -0.029 Inst Inst
(0.062) (0.069)
ln(Family Income) 0.063 0.121** 0.137**
(0.089) (0.054) (0.036)
nR2  3.612 3.876 3.700 4.317 5.374 6.255
Partial R2 0.0096 0.0107 0.0124 0.0131 0.1822 0.1352
First Stage F-STAT 2.84 3.16 3.64 3.87 31.97 23.58
obs 881 881 881 881 881 881
Note: Instruments are Quarter I, Quarter II , Quarter III and variables marked Inst.   nR
2 is the test statistic for
the overidentification test.  Partial R
2 is the amount of variation of Education explained by the instruments
controlling for the variation explained by other exogenous variables.  The First Stage F-STAT is the test statistic
for the coefficients on  instruments equaling 0 in the first stage regression.
(standard errors in parentheses) * estimate significant at 10% level.  ** estimate is significant at 5% level.29
Table 6B
Log Wage Regressions Controlling for AFQT
Quarter of Birth as an Instrument for Education
Education 0.113 0.126 0.108 0.116 0.090** 0.049
  (0.094) (0.094) (0.091) (0.090) (0.039) (0.042)
Age 0.028 0.023 0.028 0.023 0.030* 0.028
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
White 0.183** 0.147 0.158* 0.133 0.163** 0.067
(0.092) (0.110) (0.095) (0.100) (0.057) (0.064)
South -0.001 0.006 -0.009 -0.001 0.000 0.010
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039)
SMSA 0.113** 0.096* 0.121** 0.105** 0.119** 0.114**
(0.053) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045)
Momedu -0.005 -0.013 Inst Inst
(0.016) (0.015)
Dadedu -0.002 -0.007 Inst Inst
(0.009) (0.009)
Momhouse 0.060 0.045 Inst Inst
(0.125) (0.124)
Dadhouse 0.084 -0.012 Inst Inst
(0.060) (0.065)
ln(Family Income) 0.098** 0.123** 0.128**
(0.048) (0.041) (0.034)
AFQT 0.064 0.021 0.083 0.057 0.105 0.153**
(0.171) (0.165) (0.144) (0.142) (0.073) (0.073)
AFQT2 -0.053 (0.055) -0.053 -0.051 -0.044* -0.026
(0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.034) (0.025) (0.026)
nR2 3.876 4.581 3.700 4.581 6.784 7.048
Partial R2 0.0117 0.0119 0.0131 0.0133 0.0519 0.0433
First Stage F-STAT 3.45 3.50 3.86 3.92 8.89 7.30
obs 881 881 881 881 881 881
Note: Instruments are Quarter I, Quarter II , Quarter III and variables marked Inst.  nR
2 is the test statistic for
the overidentification test.  Partial R
2 is the amount of variation of Education explained by the instruments
controlling for the variation explained by other exogenous variables.  The First Stage F-STAT is the test statistic
for the coefficients on  instruments equaling 0 in the first stage regression.




Quarter of Birth and Proximity to a Local College as Instruments for Education
Education 0.126* 0.146** 0.115* 0.140** 0.128** 0.104**
  (0.072) (0.069) (0.067) (0.063) (0.018) (0.021)
Age 0.025 0.018 0.025 0.018 0.024 0.021
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
White 0.255** 0.184** 0.244** 0.196** 0.253** 0.185**
(0.068) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047)
South -0.014 -0.001 -0.015 -0.007 -0.013 -0.005
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
SMSA 0.119 0.082 0.125** 0.095** 0.117** 0.113**
(0.084) (0.070) (0.058) (0.055) (0.049) (0.048)
Momedu 0.003 -0.012 Inst Inst
(0.021) (0.018)
Dadedu 0.003 -0.006 Inst Inst
(0.013) (0.012)
Momhouse 0.045 0.012 Inst Inst
(0.123) (0.121)
Dadhouse 0.048 -0.054 Inst Inst
(0.062) (0.067)
ln(Family Income) 0.085 0.126** 0.127**
(0.077) (0.048) (0.036)
nR2 5.062 5.491 5.062 5.749 5.663 7.636
Partial R2 0.0118 0.0138 0.0159 0.0185 0.1816 0.1369
First Stage F-STAT 2.07 2.51 2.94 3.48 23.32 17.05
obs 858 858 858 858 858 858
Note:  Instruments are Quarter I, Quarter II, Quarter III, 4year, 2year and variables marked Inst. nR
2 is the test
statistic for the overidentification test.  Partial R
2 is the amount of variation of Education explained by the
instruments controlling for the variation explained by other exogenous variables.  The First Stage F-STAT is the
test statistic for the coefficients on  instruments equaling 0 in the first stage regression.  (standard errors in
parentheses)  * estimate significant at 10% level.  ** estimate is significant at 5% level.31
Table 7B
Log Wage Regressions Controlling for AFQT
Quarter of Birth and Proximity to a Local College as Instruments for Education
Education 0.084 0.097 0.075 0.094 0.091** 0.054
  (0.085) (0.085) (0.083) (0.081) (0.040) (0.044)
Age 0.028 0.022 0.028 0.022 0.027 0.025
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
White 0.172** 0.131 0.148* 0.130 0.177** 0.090
(0.081) (0.096) (0.085) (0.088) (0.056) (0.064)
South -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.009
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
SMSA 0.123** 0.104** 0.127** 0.107** 0.121** 0.114**
(0.052) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046)
Momedu 0.000 -0.009 Inst Inst
(0.015) (0.014)
Dadedu 0.001 -0.005 Inst Inst
(0.008) (0.008)
Momhouse 0.080 0.058 Inst Inst
(0.120) (0.118)
Dadhouse 0.070 -0.018 Inst Inst
(0.061) (0.063)
ln(Family Income) 0.103** 0.124** 0.120**
(0.046) (0.040) (0.035)
AFQT 0.119 0.076 0.136 0.092 0.107 0.148*
(0.153) (0.146) (0.132) (0.128) (0.075) (0.077)
AFQT2 -0.041 -0.044 -0.040 -0.042 -0.044 -0.027
(0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.026) (0.027)
nR2 5.062 5.834 4.805 5.749 6.521 7.722
Partial R2 0.0139 0.0141 0.0150 0.0193 0.0519 0.0435
First Stage F-STAT 2.43 2.50 2.67 2.82 6.44 5.24
obs 858 858 858 858 858 858
Note:  Instruments are Quarter I, Quarter II, Quarter III, 4year, 2year and variables marked Inst. nR
2 is the test
statistic for the overidentification test.  Partial R
2 is the amount of variation of Education explained by the
instruments controlling for the variation explained by other exogenous variables.  The First Stage F-STAT is the
test statistic for the coefficients on  instruments equaling 0 in the first stage regression.  (standard errors in
parentheses)  * estimate significant at 10% level.  ** estimate is significant at 5% level.32
Table 8
Log Wage Regressions
Parent’s Education Variables Instrument for Education
Education 0.123** 0.088** 0.069 0.005
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.045) (0.053)
Age 0.027 0.025 0.031* 0.031*
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
White 0.226** 0.173** 0.123** 0.025
(0.047) (0.047) (0.060) (0.072)
South -0.016 -0.002 -0.004 0.014
(0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
SMSA 0.123** 0.119** 0.128** 0.120**
(0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Momhouse 0.041 0.064 0.090 0.127
(0.108) (0.106) (0.101) (0.110)
Dadhouse 0.070 -0.042 0.091 -0.012
(0.059) (0.065) (0.058) (0.063)






nR2 0 0 0 0
Partial R2 0.1657 0.0979 0.0342 0.0233
First Stage F-STAT 101.23 67.07 22.01 16.26
obs 881 881 881 881
Note:  Instruments are Momedu and Dadedu.   nR
2 is the test statistic for the overidentification test.  Partial R
2 is
the amount of variation of Education explained by the instruments controlling for the variation explained by other
exogenous variables.  The First Stage F-STAT is the test statistic for the coefficients on  instruments equaling 0 in
the first stage regression.  (standard errors in parentheses)  * estimate significant at 10% level.  ** estimate is
significant at 5% level.33
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